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Chapter pages in book: (p. 3 - 26)A dozen years have passed since Arthur Burns
wrote the National Bureau's Thirtieth Annual
Report, New Facts on Business Cycles 1 Three
business cycles have come and gone. In the in-
terim more new facts have been uncovered and
many earlier findings have been tested, modi-
fied, and clarified. Such a process of discovery,
testing, modification, and explanation is the
essence of the National Bureau's research pro-
gram, as of any scientific effort. In this way
knowledge cumulates. It may be well to take
stock once again of our work on business cy-
cles. I shall concentrate on the contributions
that have been made since Burns' report was
written, note their practical use, and discuss
some directions that future work might take.
Such a review will demonstrate, I think, the
P A R T i unique value of continuity in our research
program.
Tested '1.THE POSTWAR SETTING
The postwar period has testified to the con- K novvleclge tinued potency of the forces that cause business
cycles. At the outset it was uncertain whether
of thebusiness cycle, as it had been known in
the past, would continue to exist. The Great
Business
Depressionand World War II had stimulated
an enormous growth in governmental activity
C
l relativetoprivate enterprise; new govern-
y cues mentalfunctions, such as insuring of bank
deposits and mortgages, provision of social
insurance, and regulation of stock market
trading, had been developed to prevent some
of the serious consequences of depressions;
and there was a new determination, epitomized
in the Employment Act of 1946, to use govern-
mental power when necessary to curb cyclical
fluctuations. In the sequel, it is clear that these
developments and some others have indeed
NOTE: I am indebted to Arthur F. Burns, Solomon
Fabricant, and other colleagues for their suggestions
on Part I of this report, and to Hal B. Lary, who
took charge of Part HI. Sophie Sakowitz and Alex-
ander Pitts were responsible for the statistical work
in this section.
iReprinted in BusinessCycleindicators, Princeton
University Press for National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1961, Vol. I, Chap. 2.
3helped to reduce the severity of cyclical de-
clines.2 On the other hand, it is equally clear
that the business cycle has not been eliminated.
Indeed, it is fair to say that the recessions
since 1945 have stimulated much greater pub-
lie interest in the problem of business cycles.
Each of these recessions has also led to a
variety of governmental actions for dealing
with the problem. All this has made it easier
•for the student of business cycles to justify his
work, and has whetted his appetite to pursue
it. Besides,.the business cycle policies of gov-
ernment have given rise to new questions for
study. For example, what were the effects of
these policies? How timely were they? How
could they have been made more effective?
What opportunities were missed and why?
Partly as a result of this interest and activity,
the postwar student of business cycles has had
at his command a greater wealth of current
economic statistics than before. The figures are
more frequent and timely—witness the replace-
ment of annual by quarterly estimates of gross
national product and its components; they are
more appropriately designed—witness the pub-
lication nowadays of numerous economic indi-
cators in seasonally adjusted form; and they
cover some new dimensions of economic activ-
ity—witness the proliferation of data on busi-
nessmen's intentions to invest and consumers'
intentions to spend.
In this setting, the National Bureau's re-
search on business cycles has come to be used
widely, not only inthis country but also
abroad. One evidence of this was the publica-
tion last autumn, following a protracted period
of experimentation and testing in which Julius
Shiskin played a primary role, of Business
Cycle Developments, a monthly report of the
United States Department of Commerce. This
report, to which I shall refer frequently, con-
tains a broad collection of economic indicators
selected and.classified by the National Bureau,
relies upon the business cycle peak and trough
dates established in the course of our re-
2&e Arthur F. Burns, "Progress Towards Eco-
nomic Stability," American Economic Review, March
1960, pp.1-19.
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searches, and includes a number of analytical
measures largely developed in our studies.3
Basically it owes its existence to the postwar
developments I have mentioned—the contin-
ued occurrence of recessions, the great public
interest in dealing with them, and the new
emphasis on. economic statistics. All this has
stimulated both our own work and its applica-
tion and testing by others, and has fostered the
accumulation of knowledge of business cycles
during the period since Burns wrote his New
Facts.
Burns formulated four chief propositions in
his report. I shall consider each of them in
turn, describing some of the applications and
tests that have since been made, and the addi-
tional knowledge we now have concerning
them.
2. BURNS' "UNSEEN CYCLE"
A business cycle, according to the definition
adopted by Burns and Mitchell,4 not only is
"a fluctuation in aggregate economic activity"
but also consists of "expansions occurring at
about the same time in many economic activi-
ties, followed by similarly general recessions,
contractions, and revivals which merge into
the expansion phase of the next cycle." Mitchell
later elaborated one aspect of this definition:
"Business cycles consist not only of roughly
synchronous expansions in many activities, fol-
lowed by roughly synchronous contractions in
a slightly smaller number; they consist also of
numerous contractionswhile expansionis
dominant, and numerous expansions while
contraction is dominant."5 That is to say, it is
characteristic of business cycles that they are
3Shiskin described the background and rationale
of the new monthly report in Signals o/ Rçcession
and Recovery: An Experiment with Monthly Re-
porting, Occasional Paper 77, New York, NBER,
1961.
4Measuring Business Cycles, New York, NBER,
1946, p. 3.
6WhatHappens during Business Cycles, New York,
NBER, 1950, p. 79;widely diffused, but itis also characteristic
that they are imperfectly diffused.
In his 1950 annual report Burns observed
that this phenomenon of diffusion constitutes
an "unseen cycle" that lies hidden within the
movements of economic aggregates. During
each expansion in total activity there is first
a rise and then a fall in the scope of the ex-
pansion, and during each contraction in total
activity there is first a rise and then a fall in
the scope of contraction. Expansionary move-
ments, which begin during a contraction in
aggregate activity, spread from firm to firm,
industry to industry; region to region, and from
one aspect of economic activity to another,
and this cumulative process takes time. Con-
tractions in their turn spread in a similar way,
beginning while aggregate activity is still rising,
but engulfing more and more enterprises and
processes until the tide turns and activity as
a whole begins to decline. In this sense, reces-
sion begins while expansion is still dominant,
and recovery begins while recession isstill
dominant.
This process is evident in every business
cycleof which we have a record. Though it
may have been "unseen" before Bums wrote,
it has been "seen" ever since, both historically
and currently. Before 1950 the only statistical
evidence on this point—in the form of what
has come to be known as a "diffusion index"—
was historical in nature. These indexes showed
what percentage of a group of activities had
undergone expansion at different stages of past
business cycles, but not what percentage was
currently expanding. Since then many current
diffusion indexes have been and
a number are regularly published in Business
Cycle Developments. From these one can de-
termine quickly, for example, what propor-
tion of companies in a large sample have
recently experienced rising profits, or what
proportion have recently increased their ap-
propriations for new investment projects.
Although the date when a business cycle
expansion reaches its widest scope depends on
how itis measured, diffusion indexes of a
broadly representative sort have invariably
reached their highest values some months be-
fore the peak in aggregate economic activity.
Burns observed that this was true of all the
prewar cycles, and, it has continued to be true.
The expansion of 1945-48 reached its widest
scope in the fourth quarter of 1947, about a
year before the business cycle peak. The nçxt
expansion (1949-53) reached its widest scope
in the third quarter of 1950, narrowed, and
then became fairly widespread again in the
third quarter of 1952, about nine months be-
fore the business' cycle peak. The 1954-57
expansion reached its maximum diffusion in
the second quarter of 1955; aggregate activity
continued to expand for two years more. The
scope of the 1958-60 expansion was greatest
in the second quarter of 1959, about a year
before the cyclical peak.6
If there is not much uniformity in these
intervals, this was also true of the prewar
record. The "unseen cycle" casts a shadow of
varying length before it. This limits, but does
not destroy, its value. No one landmark on the
road of business cycles seems to hold an ab-
solutely fixed position; yet all together they
can help us chart a sounder course.
The diffusion indexes that Burns examined
in 1950 were not only historical in nature;
'they were limited in their coverage to the
United States. Later research carried out in
Canada, Japan, and Italy demonstrates that
the diffusion phenomenon is characteristic of
those economies as well, and resembles that of
the United States (Chart 1). In these coun-
tries, too, business cycles are widely but im-
perfectly diffused, and the degree of diffusion
has the property of waxing and waning in a
cycle that precedes the cyclein aggregate
activity.
Ilse Mintz has extended diffusion analysis
to world trade. Since cyclical movements in
the imports of different countries are neither
perfectly synchronized nor scattered at ran-
6The dates of maximum diffusion are based on a
monthly index covering employment in thirty-two and
production intwenty-five nonf arm industries (see
Shiskin, Signals o/ Recession and Recovery, p. 183).
Other broadly based diffusion indexes reached peaks
at about the same dates.
5CHART 1
Diffusion Indexes for Several Countries, 1919-61
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NoTE:Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions in each country; unshaded areas, expansions.
SouRcE:Appendix.
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'57'58'59'60'61'62dom, they form both a cycle in aggregate world
trade and a diffusion cycle that precedes it'
(Chart 2). Her diffusion index shows that in
most of the postwar period most countries have
expanded their imports, but it also brings out
the less well-known fact that at times very
widespread reductions have occurred. At these
times, or shortly afterward, our own exports
have declined, and they have not begun to
rise again until rising imports have become
rather general in the rest of the world. The
diffusion index is an indicator of demand for
our exports, and they have been highly respon-
sive to it. In these .days, when the balance of
payments is a matter of national concern, it
is well to keep an eye on such clues as this
index may give to the prospects for exports.7
Discerning the process of cyclical diffusion
long after the fact is easy; recognizing what is
going on currently is far more difficult, as the
indexes in Chart1 demonstrate. Numerous
devices to accomplish this have been tested,
both at the National Bureau and elsewhere,
and mote no doubt will be. Eventually it may
become no more difficult to date a "reference
peak" in diffusion indexes—representing the
point at which the business, cycle expansion
reached its widest scope—than to date a busi-
ness cycle peak, and likewise for troughs. If
this could be done not too long, after the event,
it would improve our capacity to identify the
current stage of the business cycle and to
envisage the next stage.
The matter is important, for one of the find-
ings to which the study of diffusion indexes
has led is that the change in scope of an ex-
pansion or contraction during a business cycle
has a great deal to do with the rate at which
aggregate activity expands or contiacts. Ex-
pansions do not proceed at a constant pace.
Some expansions are vigorous, others lethargic.
There is much evidence to show that the vari-
ations both within and between expansions are
attributable in large part to differences in the
number of firms or industries that are expand-
7For another type of clue, see the report by Lary
in Part III.
ing. Hence it would seem to be desirable, if
we are concerned with preserving and extend-
ing the rate of growth of the economy, that we
also be concerned with making expansion as
general as is practicable. By this criterion,
policies that have widespread stimulative ef-
fects are better, other things being equal, than
those With narrow effects. Choices cannot, of
course, always be made along these lines, but
our studies of diffusion suggest that it may be
an important consideration.
To illustrate the relation between diffusion
and rate of expansion, consider the dates men-
tioned earlier, when the postwar expansions
reached their widest scope. On the first occa-
sion, the fourth quarter of 1947, gross national
product in constant prices was currently rising
at an annual rate of 6 per cent. On the succeed-
ing dates of maximum diffusion, the annual
percentage rates of expansion in GNP were
19, 4, 8, and 12. So far the current expansion.
was most widespread in the second quarter of
1961, at which time the rate of expansion in
GNP' again was 12 per cent per year. These
ratesare, of course, exceedingly high, far
greater than those sustained over each expan-
sion as a whole.8 Except perhaps for the last,
they occurred when each expansion was as
widespread as it ever got to be.
3. LEADS AND LAGS
After commenting on the reasonableness of the
proposition that cyclical movements spread
gradually through the economy in the manner
described' by diffusion indexes, Burns lifted
"the veil of anonymity" clothing these indexes
8The rates cited are based on changes from the
preceding quarter, converted to annual equivalents.
The annual rates for the entire expansion from
business cycle trough to business cycle peak are: IV
1945—IV 1948, 1.1 per cent; IV 1949—Il 1953, 7.2
per cent; III 1945—Ill 1957, 4.3 per cent; II 1958—
111960, 5.9 per cent. The rate for the first expansion
is low, partly because GNP had, by the fourth quar-
ter of 1945, not yet reached its lowest point. If the





and developed the proposition that this cumu-
lative movement contains sequences that per-
sist in some degree from one cycle to the next.
A diffusion index based on a range of eco-
nomic activities may tell us that the proportion
undergoing expansion first rises and then falls
during a business cycle upswing, but it does
not tell which activities came first in the pro-
cession, or whether any of them came first in
every cycle or most cycles.
Since these sequences may contain clues to
the causal process of business cycles, it is im-
portant to look for them. One of the strongest
conclusions that emerged from our studies of
business cycles before World War II, Burns
observed, was that "the check to the dominant
8
movement of business activity, whether it be
expansion or contraötion, is typically felt es-
pecially early in financial processes and activi-
ties preparatory to investment expenditure."
By this he meant that such indices as •new
orders for investment goods, construction con-
tracts and building permits, stock prices and
market activity, new security issues, and starts
of business enterprises typically turn down
before aggregate production, employment, in-
come, or sales, and that they typically turn up
earlier also. Note that these activities are prep-
aratory to investment expenditure, representing
an early, decision-making stage of the prpcess
of investment, not the actual expenditure or
final, installation stage.
CHART 2
United States Exports, World Imports, and Percentage
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NOTE: Shaded areas represent U.S. business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.This finding has been confirmed in the post-
war period. Moreover, we now have some
valuable new statistical series with which to
observe the process. For example, one of the
products of Zarnowitz' study of the cyclical
behavior of new orders was a series that com-
bined 'orders for machinery and equipment
with contracts for construction of commercial
and industrial buildings and utility plants. This
monthly series, a direct descendant of Burns'
compilation for 19 19-39, is currently published
in Business Cycle Developments. Burns' index
reached cyclical highs and lows in 'advance of
every business cycle peak and trough but one
intheinterwar period,withan average
(median)lead of four months. The new
series has led at every business cycle peak and
trough of the postwar period, with an average
(median) lead of five months. There can be
no question that decisions to invest, in the
aggregate, typically take an unfavorable turn
well before there is any decline in aggregate
output, sales, or income, and that they usually
begin to improve before there is any improve-
ment in these basic factors.
We shall return to this matter later. Mean-
time, note that there are other persistent se-
quences in business cycles. Some pertain to
the labor market. For example, Bry has shown
that in virtually all industries cyclical adjust-
ments in the workweek take place prior to
adjustments in employment, on the average
about four months earlier. This comes about
as enterprises seek to achieve a prompt and
efficient balance of labor and other resources
devoted to production. Other repetitive se-
quences are found among different types of
inventories, as shown by Abramovitz' and
Stanback's studies; in the markets for stocks
and bonds, as Macaulay's and Hickman's work
demonstrated; and in the behavior of prices,
costs, and profits, as Hultgren has shown. Se-
quences in the cyclical movements of these
diverse elements have different though related
causes, and the authors of the studies men-
tioned have taken great care in working out
the explanations and testing their hypotheses
and findings. All of these types of sequence,
and others, were mentioned in Burns' report,
although additional work has been done since
then.
One way in which we have sought to make
the results available for practical use is to
compile lists of indicators, classified according
to their typical timing in business cycles. Three
such lists have been constructed, one in 1938
by Mitchell and Burns, the other two by me
in 1950 and 1960. Each of these lists has
drawn on the studies that had previously been
made, and each has been tested against sub-
sequent data. One of them (the 1950 list) has
also been tested on data for another country
Canada. The results reveal a substantial degree
of persistence in the characteristic timing of
the selected series.9 The successive revisions
in the lists reflect largely the expanding scope
of our studies and the improvements in avail-
able data; changes in cyclical behavior account
for only a small fraction of the revisions. For
practical reasons the lists have been restricted
to a modest number of indicators—twenty-one
in the first two and twenty-six in the third.
However, the publication of Business Cycle
Developments has made it feasible to use a
much larger list, which we therefore supplied
for the purpose. It also will make it convenient
to revise the list more frequently and therefore
to incorporate more promptly the results of
new research and new statistical compilations.
Studies of leads and lags can, as I have said,
contribute to understanding of the causal proc-
esses involved in business cycles. By helping
us to recognize the interconnections among
current developments, and to distinguish the
more significant and meaningful from the less,
they enhance our ability to forecast. As a
resdit, although many uncertainties remain, a
turn in the business cycle can now be recog-
nized more promptly and with greater confi-
dence than was the case twenty or even ten
years 'ago.
4. THE ROLE OF PROFITS
The subject of price-cost-profit relations in
business cycles has had a long history. Wesley
9SeeBusinessCycle Indicators, Vol. 1, Chaps. 1-4,
7, 10. For a test of the 1960 list, see pp. 65-66, below.
9Mitchell gave it much attention in his Business
Cycles (1913). He viewed the encroachment
of unit costs on prices as one of the critical
factors that brought a boom to an end, just as
he viewed the reduction of costs relative to
prices as a significant factor in the revival in
business that followed depression. There the
matter was virtually left, as far as empirical
research was concerned, until Hultgren took
it up in his American Transportation in Pros-
perity and Depression (1948). The result left
Mitchell doubtful about the validity of his
original formulation,'° but Hultgren'slater
work on other industries than railroads put a
different face on the matter, as Burns observed
in New Facts. In support of Mitchell's propo-
sitions, Burns cited the evidence contained in
Hultgren's analysis of the diffusion of profits.1'
Since then, Hultgren's further work on costs,
prices, and profits, part of which was pub-
lished in 1960, and study of pro-
ductivity, published last year, have provided
much new evidence.12 Now; with the publica-
tion of Business Cycle Developments, one can
trace currently, for the first time, many of the
important links among the processes that center
around the cyclical behavior of profits.
Let me state the salient findings on this
subject as they now appear to stand, particu-
larly for manufacturing industries. A collection
of relevant series is shown in Charts 3 and 4.
Table 1 summarizes the timin,g of these series
at business cycle peaks and troughs since 1919.
lOSee -Arthur F. Burns (ed.), Wesley Clair Mitch-




NBER, 1950; reprinted in Business Cycle indicators,
Vol.1, Chap. 11.
l2Thor Hultgren, Changesin Labor Cost During
Cycles in Production and Business, OccasionalPaper
74, New York, NBER, 1960; John W. Kendrick,
Productivity Trends inthe UnitedStates,Princeton
for NBER, 1961. See also EdwinKuh, "Profits,
Profit Markups, and Productivity," Study Paper 15,
Emp!oy,nent,Growth, and PriceLevels, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1960.
Canadian economists have cultivated this area, too,
and their analysis of an independent body of infor-
mation provides a valuable check on our own.
10
1.Price-costratiosandprofitmargins
(profits per dollar of sales) undergo sharp
fluctuations in general conformity with business
cycles but with significant leads at both peaks
and troughs.18 The movements are so sharp
that they often dominate those in aggregate
profits, even though the latter are sustained
by rising sales while margins are declining
toward. the end of expansions, and are de-
pressed by falling sales while margins are
improving near the end of contractions. As a
result of the sharp movements in the ratio of
prices to costs, the average (median) lead of
aggregate profits at business cycle turns since
1919 has been only slightly shorter than the
average lead of theprice-costratio:two
months in the one case, four months in the
other (Table 1, cols. 5 and 6). Turns in both
the price-cost ratio and in total profits have
usually preceded the corresponding turns in
production, although the tendency is clearer in
the ratio than in total profits, and the evidence
of a lead in profits is stronger for the postwar
than for the prewar period.
2. The cyclical leads of profit margins can-
not be attributed to early downturns or up-
turns in the prices of manufactured goods. This
price level has usually risen throughout busi-
ness cycle expansions and stabilized or fallen
throughout contractions. The price-cost ratio
and the profit margin have usually turned
before prices, and in recent cycles have under-
gone sharp cyclical contractions even while
the price level was rising.
3. The timing of profit margins is primarily
determined by the movements of unit costs,
particularly unit-labor costs. These costs have
usually declined during the initial stages of
business cycle expansions, but have begun to
131f the data on costs, prices, profits, and sales were
comprehensive and comparable, the profit margin
would be equal to one minus the reciprocal of the
price-cost ratio. Hence the movements in the margin
and the ratio would always be in the same direction
and their turning points would coincide. The series
used in ChartIand Table1do not possess this
elegant relationship, but since 1947 (when the margin




NOTE: All series are adjusted for seasonal vari-
ations. Shaded areas are business cycle contractions;
unshaded areas, expansions. Prices, labor cost, and
price/labor cost ratio are on arithmetic scales, all
others on ratio scales.
SOURCE: See Appendix.
rise before the end of expansion (that is, while
output was still rising), and the upturn has
been accompanied or soon followed by a down-
turn in profit margins. Unit costs have con-
tinued to rise during the early months of busi-
nesscontractions,but have turned down
usually a few months before the end, reversing
the decline in margins. Of course, like the two
blades of the proverbial scissors, both prices
and costs. determine margins, but costs have
generally been the widely moving element ac-
counting for the leads in margins.'4
4. Unit-labor costs tend to move inversely
with output because of the overhead nature of
certain types of jobs, contractual commitments,
and so on, but at the same time other factors
cause them to move in a significantly different
way from output.'5 Were it not for these dif-
ferences, profit margins and price-cost ratios
might be expected to duplicate the movements
of production rather than to lead them.
5.Someof the factors that bring about the
distinctive behavior of unit-labor costs can be
seen when cost is subdivided into its two com-
ponents, average hourly compensation and
output. per man-hour. The early stages of a
business cycle expansion usually witness a
rapid rise in output per man-hour and a slower
rise in hourly compensation; hence unit costs
decline. In the later stages, output per man-
hour rises less rapidly than before, and hourly
compensation more rapidly. When the advance
in compensation exceeds that in output per
man-hour, unit costs rise. This happened, for
l4This result for manufacturing is confirmed by
economy-wide data for all corporations developed
by Kuh in the study cited in footnote 12. He defines
the profit markup as the ratio of the value of net
output to wages, with the value of net output being
equal to profits plus wages. Hence the markup is
equal to the ratio of prices to labor cost per unit of
output; in terms of the profit margin, it is the re-
ciprocal of one minus the margin (see footnote 13).
Kuh divides the quarterly percentage change in mark-
up into a price component and three other com-
ponents: net output, man-hours, and hourly wage rate
(see his Table 8, p. 107), which we have combined
to form a unit labor cost component. We find that in
34 out of 49 quarters, 1947-59, the cost effect on the
profit markup exceeded the price effect. On the
average, it was twice as large. In addition, the cost
effect was highly correlated over time with the change
in the markup, whereas the price effect was not.
l5Compare the inverted timing comparisons for
labor costs with the (positive) comparisons for pro-
duction in Table 1, cols. 4 and 1.
UCHART 4
Output per Man-hour, Hourly Compensation, and Labor Cost per Unit
of Output, Manufacturing (All Employees), 1947-61
NOTE: All series are adjusted for seasonal variations. Shaded areas are business cycle contractions; un-
shaded areas, expansions (monthly chronology). The top three series are on ratio scales.
SOURCE: See Appendix.
alncluding wages, salaries, and supplements.
bPercentage changes between quarterly averages, one year apart, centered at midyear.
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1947'48'49 '54'55'56'57'58'59'60TABLE 1
COSTS, PROFITS, AND RELATED VARIABLES: NUMBER OF LEADS AND LAGS AND THEIR MEDIAN
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Manu-sale per Unit Ratio,ProfitsGross forEquip-










Leads exceeding 12 mos. ... ... ... 3 2 ... 4 1
Leads of 7-12 mos. 1 2 ... 5 4 4 4 2
Leads of 1-6 mos. 6 4 .. 3 10 7 9 14 2
Coincidences 7 2 ... 1 1 4 2 1 4
Lags of 1-6 mos. 3 4 6 1 2 2 ... 13
Lags of 7-12 mos. ... .. 6 ... ... ... .. ...
Lags exceeding 12 mos. 1 3 ... ,.. ... ... ..
Total Comparisons 17 13 15 13 19 17 19 18 19
Bus. Cycle Turns Skipped
Number 2 6 4 5 .... ... ... ...
Years when they occurred'26-7'53-61'24-9'26-33, .. ...
'48
... ...
Bus. Cycle Turns Not Covered
Number ... ... ... 1 ... 2 ... 1
Years when they occurred ... ... ... '19 ... '19-20 ... '48
Extra Specific Cycle Turns
Number .. 2 2 2 2 4 4 ...






lag (+),inmos. 0 0+9 —8 —4 —2 —4 —5+1
NOTE: Leads or lags at the wartime peak, February 1945, and postwar trough, October 1945, are omitted.
When unit labor cost is treated invertedly (col. 4), peaks are matched with business cycle troughs and troughs
with business cycle peaks.
SOURCE: See Appendix.
13example, in 1950, 1955, and again in 1959,
as Chart 4 shows. When business contracts, a
brief decline usually occurs in man-hour out-
put while compensation rates continue to rise,
lifting unit costs. Later in the contraction the
rate of increase in output per man-hour picks
up while the advance in hourly compensation
weakens; and when the former exceeds the
latter, unit, costs begin to decline. As the chart
shows, this occurred in manufacturing industry
as a whole.in1949, 1954,1958, and 1961.
Thus the wide swings in the rate of change in
output per man-hour and in hourly compen-
sation have pursued very different courses dur-
ing business cycles, and their systematic failure
to synchronize 'has been responsible for the
cyclical swings in unit-labor costs and, ulti-
mately, for those in profit margins.16
In this account, I have traced only the prox-
imate factors 'determining the cyclical behavior
of costs and profits. A full account would, of
course, deal with the effect on prices and sales
of changes in demand by business enterprises,
consumers, and government; with the effect
on output per man-hour of changes in the level
of output, in the efficiency of workers and
management, and in the utilization of capa-
city; with the effect on hourly compensation
l6Kendrjck's recent study of productivity provides
some interesting information on cyclical patterns of
change in output per man-hour in manufacturing,
although his data are annual. In the first year of
each of the nineteen business cycle expansions from
1888 to, 1960, output per man-hour rose, and the
average change was +7.2 per cent. Sixteen of these
expansions lasted at least' two years; the average
change in the first year was +7.7 per cent; in the
second, +2.6 per cent. For the eight expznsions that
lasted at least three years, the average change in the
first year was +7.1 per cent; in the second, +3.3
per cent; and in the final year of expansion, —0.6
per cent. Output per man-hour declined in the final
year of six of these eight expansions. In the first year
of the eighteen business cycle contractions, the aver-
age change in output per man-hour was +0.3 per
cent. In eight instances it fell; in ten it rose. Since
only three contractions lasted more than a year, on
an annual basis, the data provide virtually no in-
formation on the characteristic pattern of change
during contractions.
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of changes in overtime earnings, in the relative
number of employees at various wage levels,
and in wage and salary rates as affected by
escalation clauses and the negotiation of new
contracts; and with the effect on costs of such
factors as materials prices, interest payments,
and maintenance. A full account would also
tell what diffusion indexes of prices, profits,
costs, and output contribute to our knowledge
of the way these developments spread from
industry to industry and from firm to firm.
Finally, it would consider whether my sketch
applies to industries outside of manufacturing,
as well as to what extent it is representative of
individual manufacturing industries.17 Many of
these matters are covered in Hultgren's in-
vestigation.
If costs do have a dominant influence on the
cyclical behavior of profit margins, which in
turn dominate the swings in total profits, they
must play an important role in the generation
of business cycles, as Mitchell. long ago sus-
pected. For along with other developments
they affect the prospect of profit, which remains
one of the strongest incentives in a private
enterprise economy. How far does the upturn
in costs and the ensuing downturn in margins
that takes place while sales and output are
still expanding explain the downturn in orders
for equipment and contracts for plant construc-
tion, which also occurs while businessis
171n addition, there are important technical ques-
tions having to do with the measurement of output
per man-hour, prices, costs, and profits. For example,
the on output per man-hour used in Chart 4
is based on an index of output constructed, in part,
with the aid of interpolated and extrapolated mea-
sures of output per man-hour; hence it reflects, in
part, these interpolations -and extrapolations rather
than actually recorded levels. It is also based on an
estimate of man-hours that assumes, for lack of in-
formation,thatso-callednonproduction workers
were employed for a forty-hour week throughout the
period. These assumptions can be, and to some extent
have been, tested and the results compared with
alternative methods of estimation. One of the critical
tests is the comparison of the price-labor cost ratio
with the independently derived profit per dollar
of sales (see Chart 3). 'The broad conclusions are
supported by thesetests,but thefigures cannot
be regarded as precise.expanding? Does the price-cost squeeze, and
its reversal, help to explain the leads in the
hiring rate and in the layoff rate? Is it a factor
in the early turns in the number of new enter-
prises established and in the bankruptcies of
larger-size businesses, which have been a regu-
lar feature of business cycles for nearly a
hundred years, as Zarnowitz and Lerner have
shown? These apparent links between costs,
prices,profits, and decisions by business enter-
prises to expand or contract operations need
to be carefully checked and worked out. With
the data now available we are in a good posi-
tion to carry out such a study.
5. MILD AND SEVERE DEPRESSIONS
Burns concluded his report on New Facts with
the proposition that there are systematic differ-
ences between, mild and severe depressions,
and that the elucidation of these differences is
a crucially important line of research, because
severe depressions must be prevented. As an
indication of the way in which developments
during a boom may increase the severity of a
subsequent depression, he cited the work of
Mintz and of Saulnier, which disclosed that
the quality of new issues of foreign govern-
ment bonds and of. urban mortgages deterio-
rated as the boom of the 1920's pr9gressed.
This deteriorationcontributed, through: its
impact on default rates, to the severity of the
depression of the thirties. He thought that
further research would be fruitful on this and
on other clues to the problem why some busi-
ness contractions remain mild while others
become extremely serious.
Although each of the five contractions since
World War II has,' by comparison with the
more severe prewar contractions, been mild
or moderate, the problem is still an important
one. Closely related to it, and no less impor-
tant, is the problem of ensuring the vigor of
expansions. Of the advances in our under-
standing of these matters that have been made
in recent years, I shall discuss two in some
detail and briefly mention others.
The method of cyclical analysis described
by Burns and Mitchell in Measuring Business
Cycles (1946) involved the computation of
patterns showing in skeleton form the behavior
of a given statistical series during each business
cycle that it covered. From these patterns the
characteristic behavior of production, prices,
and other activities could be discerned, and
the patterns could be used to reveal the cyclical
interrelationships among different economic
variables. In recent years we have given atten-
tion to the adaptation of these patterns to
current business cycle analysis, and in parti-
cular to the problem of distinguishing, as
promptly as possible, severe contractions and
vigorous expansions from their milder coun-
terparts.
Some examples of the results are shown in
Chart 5. Consider the second panel, industrial
production. The numbered points represent
the course of production during each business
cycle recovery since 1920. Points numbered
(1) refer to the recovery that began in No-
vember 1927, following the mildest contrac-
tion of the entire Points numbered (10)
refer to the recovery beginning March 1933,
following the severe contraction of 1929-33.
The other recoveries are arrayed similarly, the
current recovery (solid line) being (3) since
the 1960-61 contraction is the third mildest in
the list. Except for the current recovery the
levels are shown only every six months in
order to simplifythe chart. The dashed line is
an average (median) pattern based on the six
recoveries that followed mild or
contractions, this range of experience being
most nearly pertinent to the current situation.
Historical analysis of the type described by
Burns and Mitchell led to certain findings con-
cerning the behavior of industrial production
during business cycles. One was that rates of
increase during the initial stages of recovery
were generally larger following severe con-
tractions than following mild ones. Another
was that initial rates of increase (during, say,
the first six to twelve months) usually exceeded
those at any subsequent time during the busi-
ness expansion, although the retardation that













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ceeded by some reacceleration toward the end
of expansion.'8
The production patterns serve both to dem-
onstrate these findings and to relate them to
recent experience. The fact that in each column
of dots the higher numerals are generally at
the top demonstrates the first finding, since
the high numerals identify recoveries follow-
ing severe contractions. The greater rate of
increase in production during thefirstsix
months of recovery than later is apparent, too.
Although many factors affect the pace of a
recovery and cause the variations that are
evident in the chart, it also reveals some—
although not a high—degree of stability in the
relative positions of the several recoveries after
the first six months.
A broad collection of such patterns, cover-
ing various aspects of economic activity, such
as employment, income, sales, prices, costs,
profits, and investment, can, I think, bring into
useful focus a large portion of the historical
experience garnered in our business cycle
studies, demonstrating the variations that have
occurred from cycle to cycle as well as the
consensus,revealingrelationshipsbe,tween
unusual developments in one sector and those
in another, and helping distinguish the econ-
omy's larger swings from its more ephemeral
twists and turns. Some charts of this sort are
provided each month in Business Cycle De-
velopments. By such means any current ex-
pansion can be compared with its predecessors
as it proceeds, its vigor can be assessed, fore-
casts of its future course appraised, and un-
usual aspects noted. Similar charts can be
constructed for recessions, and appear to be
helpful in distinguishing the more severe of
these episodes from the less.
18A deficiency of Chart 5isthat it does not clearly
depict events at the end of expansion, since expan-
sions have lasted various lengths of time, often more
than the twenty-four months covered by the chart.
Hence the protracted slowing down in the growth of
industrialproduction shown by the median (dashed)
line on the chart does not properly ôharactenze what
happens toward the end of a business cycle expansion,
although the rate of growth in, say, the last twelve
months of expansion has, as a rule, been smaller than
in the first twelve.
During the 1957-58 recession we conducted
an experiment designed to facilitate a series of
judgments on its ultimate severity. Historical
evidence had suggested that, about four months
after a downturn began, features that would
distinguish a severe contraction from a mild
one could begin to be discerned in early-moving
indicators. As the contraction proceeded, more
evidence would accumulate month by month,
providing a basis for revising or retaining the
initial judgment and reducing the uncertainty
surrounding it, although no more than a rough
ranking of the current contraction relative to
earlier ones was envisaged. The method also
provided an approximate estimate of how long
economic activity would remain depressed,
based essentially on an estimate of how long
it would take, after recovery started, to regain
the prerecession level. The latter intervals are
generally shorter, the milder the contraction.
The preliminary results for 1957-58 were
published in Measuring Recessions (Occa-
sional Paper 61, 1958), and a supplement
showing how the experiment ultimately turned
out was included in Business Cycle Indicators.
The 1957-58 contraction ranked fifth in ulti-
mate severity among the eight that had oc-
curred since and the period of "de-
pressed activity" lasted nineteen months ac-
cording to the industrial production index. This
ranking was initially indicated by data covering
the first four months of the contraction, i.e.,
July-November 1957, and was substantially
confirmed in each succeeding month there-
after. The period of "depressed activity" was
considered likely, on the basis of historical
experience, to fall within a range of eighteen
to thirty months, and the actual interval turned
out to be at the lower end of this range.
A similar experiment was carried out during
the 1960-61 recession. In this case, data cover-
ing the first four months (May-September
1960) suggested that the contraction would
rank close to the mildest of the eight since
1920, and this ranking was substantially sup-
'9Omitting the contraction of February-October
1945 because of its anomalous character.
19ported in each succeeding month.2° The total
decline from the business cycle peak, May
1960, to the trough, February 1961, turned
out to be, by most measures, somewhat larger
than the 1926-27 contraction, but smaller than
any of the other seven. The period of "de-
pressed activity," thirteen months as measured
by the industrial production index, was cor-
respondingly brief.
These experiments are an example of efforts
to take account of the fact that the amplitude
of each business cycle varies from its fellows,
to understand the variations that have occurred,
and to utilize that understanding in appraising
the current cycle. Let me 'now turn to another
illustration, prompted by the recent publica-
tion by the Joint Economic Committee of
Thomas Stanback's Postwar Cycles in Manu-
facturers' inventories.2' This monograph has
also been published by the National Bureau as
No. 11 in Studies in Business Cycles.
In his basic study, inventories and Business
Cycles (1950), Abramovitz observed that
changes in the rate of accumulation of inven-
tories are related to the cyclical swings in
business activity in a highly important and
systematic way: their contribution to an up-
swing or downswing is likely to be large initi-
ally, but to dwindle as the expansion or con-
tractionlengthens.Consequently,inshort
business cycle phases the change in inventory
investment is apt to have a dominating influ-
ence, whereas in longer swings other factors
take on the chief role.
Stanback shows that this pattern has con-
tinued to be true of the postwar period. Re-
ductions in inventory investment have been a
prime factor in each of the postwar business
contractions, which have been relatively short.
On the other hand, increases in inventory in-
vestment have been of primary significance
2OSee my testimony at the hearings on the Current
Economic Situation and Short-Run Outlook before
the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 2nd
Session, December 7 and 8, 1960, pp. 92-107.
2lprinted in Inventory Fluctuations and Economic
Stabilization, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961.
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only in the early stages of the expansions,
which have been relatively long. For example,
in the four expansions between 1946 and 1960,
gross national product (in 1954 prices) rose
by $20 billion in the first year and by $14
billion in the second, on the average. The rise
in inventory investment contributed $4 billion
to the advance in the first year, less than half
a billion in the second. Not only did the con-
tribution of inventory investment to the rate
of expansion in GNP become smaller as the
expansions proceeded, but it accounted for a
large part of the reduction in the rate of ex-
pansion itself.
Hence there is a systematic shift in the effect
of inventory investment on economic activity
during a business cycle. There is also a shift
in its composition. The initial impact during
an expansion, Stanback shows, is largely at-
tributable to a rise in investment in purchased
materials and goods-in-process inventories.
Later on the rise in investment in finished-
goods inventories typically becomes the dom-
inant factor. Similar statements apply to con-
tractions.
Stanback probes further into the behavior
of purchased materials by examining the level
of unfilled orders, which provides a motive for
accumulating materials for future use, and the
availability of materials, which also can stimu-
late or inhibit accumulation. Ruth Mack has
beeninvestigatinga new concept inthis
connection, one that combines stocks of ma-
terials on hand with those that are on order.
Since purchasing decisions are made with an
eye on both quantities, and unforeseen changes
in the one can be offset quickly by deliberate
changes in the other, this idea is surely worth
pursuing. A preliminary draft of her analysis
appeared in the Joint Committee print referred
to above; a final version will, we expect, be
completed shortly.
Theseinvestigations have an important
bearing on the brief and relatively mild busi-
ness cycle contractions that have characterized
the postwar economy. Substantial progress has
been made, also, on other research on the
•severity of depressions and the vigor of ex-
pansions. Earley and his associates have fol-lowed up the findings of Mintz and Saulnier
on the quality of credit with an extensive
investigation designed to produce means of
detecting signs of deterioration at an early
stage. The studies of Friedman and Schwartz
have revealed that sharp contractions in the
money supply have occurred only in severe
depressions. Abramovitz' study of long waves
suggests that during the long upswings in con-
struction,businesscycleexpansions have
usually been long and vigorous and contrac-
tions brief and mild; while during the long




The program of research that has yielded the
results.! have described is a continuing one.
The reports in Part III tell what is presently
under way. But we shOuld look beyond them.
A portion of our resources should be devoted
to testing and extending previously established
results.Business cyclesare ever-changing.
Mitchell recognized this when he wrote in
1913: "It is probable that the economists of
each generation will see reason to recast the
theory of business cycles which they learned
intheir youth." Continuous testing of old
hypotheses against new data will permit us to
discard what seems wrong and retain what
seems right. In one field or another, therefore,
we should always be seeking to test and verify.
Even though each of the individual pieces of
research be of small dimension, the cumulative
result of such a program can be great.
Our research should also have the focus
and stimulus provided by basic studies which
either cover a wide range or break new paths.
The work I have just reviewed suggests two
such studies. One would deal systematically
with the relations between costs, prices, and
profits on the one hand, and business decisions
to expand or to contract on the other. A
thorough analysis of this basic process, as I
have already indicated, is both needed and
feasible. A second study of great importance
would explore historically,statistically, and
analytically the factors that differentiate mild
from severe depressions, as well as those that
promote vigorous, prolonged expansions that
produce real growth without inflation. It would
weigh not only the lessons of history but also
how those lessons can be applied to the
present and what information and policies may
be needed to apply them.
Although both these studies should provide
new guides for business cycle policy, it also
seems desirable, as we plan future research
on business cycles, to consider a study that
would deal directly and comprehensively with
business cycle policy.
Business cycle policy has come to embrace
a wide range of interrelated actions and insti-
tutions—tax policy, debt management, mone-
tary policy, public works, housing, unemploy-
ment compensation, deposit insurance, stock
market regulation, mortgage guarantee and
insurance, to mention a few. Many of these
activities have been treated in earlier National
Bureau studies. Housing Issues in Economic
Stabilization Policy (1960) by Grebler; Fed-
eral Lending and Loan Insurance (1958) by
Saulnier, Halcrow, and Jacoby; Federal Grants
and the Business Cycle (1952) by Maxwell;
Planning and Control of Public Works (1930)
by Wolman; and the conference reports on
Consumer Instalment Credit (1957), Policies
to Combat Depression (1956), and Regulari-
zation of Business Investment (1954) are
examples from a long list. Many of our current
investigations—ofinterestrates,consumer
credit, money supply, tax policies for economic
growth, international economic relations, as
well as this spring's conference on monetary
economics—touch various aspects of business
cycle policy.
The monographic studies we have issued
demonstrate, I believe, that this difficult sub-
ject can be treated on an objective basis. A
larger effort in this direction therefore seems
feasible. As I remarked at the outset, the post-
war period has provided a wealth of policy
actions to study, and new actions and experi-
ments are constantly being undertaken or
21proposed. Do we not have a public responsi-
bility to try, sooner or later, to undertake a
comprehensive study of the vital subject of
business cycle policy?
7.CONTINUITY
In May 1938 the National Bureau published
its first report on business cycle indicators; in
October 1961, some twenty-three years later,
a federal agency began publishing a monthly
statistical report based on our most recent
selection and classification of indicators. This
experience is not unique. Many of the results
of National Bureau studies have eventually
been incorporated in the regularstatistical
work of government agencies—the estimates
of national income, of productivity, of con-
sumer credit, of the flow of funds, for example.
This outcome, fostered by the cooperation and
initiative of many government economists and
other officials, has made our research more
broadly useful. But it would not have come
about unless the research itself commanded
confidence, and confidenceis not attained
overnight.
The scientific integrity of the individual who
is responsible for the research—the author—
is one basic ingredient upon which this confi-
dence depends. There are also other. vital
ingredients, not the least of which is the careful
review of each of our studies by the research
staff, by the Board, and often by outside ex-
perts. This reviewing process virtually always
brings out points that require revision or
clarification before final publication. Another
factor, and one that I wish to stress, is the
continuity in our research program itself. Con-
tinuity and responsibility go together. If mis-
takes have, despite all precautions, been made,
it is our duty to correct them; if new data
suggest that earlier results are no longer valid,
it is our duty to set them straight. In this way
confidence in the dependability of research is
built up and preserved.
Continuity in a research program also helps
to ensure that the results of research will
cumulate, producing a growing body of tested
22
knowledge. Ad hoc projects are much less
likely to have this effect. All research generates
questions as well as answers. In a continuing
program the questions can be picked up and
new studies planned to deal with them. New
ideas generated in the course of research be-
come the focus of new work, and the interest
and experience of those engaged is enlisted to
the full.
Finally, continuity in a research program
fosters thoroughness. Investigations of this
type take a great deal of time—time to collect
the evidence, time to think through its implica-
tions, time to recover from false starts, time
to consider the views of one's colleagues, time
to write and rewrite the results and to docu-
ment them so that others can verify the work
and extend it. The problems we select must
be worth the time—and the money that it costs.
If we choose our research wisely, we shall
anticipate many of the problems of the day
and make it easier to reach sound conclusions.
The history of the National Bureau's re-
search has demonstrated this truth over and
over again. When Mitchell and Burns were
requested by the Secretary of the Treasury, in
the fall of 1937 as the economy was under-
going a sharp contraction, to tell him what
statistical series would give the earliest reliable
indication that the contraction was coming to
an end, they were able to give him a prompt
answer. The answer was not only essentially
valid for that contraction but for every one
since.. This accomplishment was made possible
by the basic studies of business cycles that they
could draw upon, which had been under way
for many years before. 1937. Last summer,
when the Joint Economic Committee requested
the National Bureau for a report that would
contribute to their investigation of inventory
fluctuations and economic stabilization, we
were able within a short time to provide them
with the results of Stanback's work, the cul-
mination of several years of methodical re-
search. His work in turn depended heavily
upon Abramovitz' study, which was begun in
1938, just as Abramovitz had depended upon
other studies of the National Bureau. Thern
confidence that Stanback's report justifies is aproduct of the continuing program of basic
research of which it was a part.
"The ultimate goal of science in any field,"
Milton Friedman22 once wrote, "is a theory—
an integrated 'explanation' of observed phe-
nomena that can be used to make valid pre-
dictions about phenomena not yet observed.
Many kinds of work can contribute to this
ultimate goal and are essential for its attain-
ment: the collection of observations about the
2ZWesley Clair Mitchell, The EconomicScientist,
p.237.
phenomena in question; the organization and
arrangement of observations and the extraction
of empirical generalizations from them; the
development of improved methods of measur-
ing or analyzing observations; the formulation
of partial or complete theories to integrate
existing evidence."
We have not reached this ultimate goal, but
we are striving toward it—in our business
cycle studies as in our other major investi-
gations.
GEOFFREY H. MOoRE
Associate Director of Research
23APPENDIX
SOURCE NOTES FOR CHARTS. AND TABLE 1
CHART 1
United Stares: 191 Based on specific cycles
in the components of index D57.0, Business
Cycle Indicators, Princeton for NBER, 1961,
Vol. II, pp. 68-70.
1947-61: Based on changes over one-month
span in 1960 list of indicators, excluding
GNP in constant prices; cf.Signals of
Recession and Recovery, Occasional Pa-
per 77, New York, NBER, 1961, P. 74.
Canada: 1919-39: Edward J. Chambers, "Cana-
dian Business Cycles since 1919: A Progress
Report," The Canadian Journal of Economics
and Political Science, May 1958, p. 176 (data
supplied by author).
1947-61: Economics Branch, Department
of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa.
Japan: 1919-36: M. Baba and I. Sugiura, Keiki-
hendo no Bunseki to Yosoku ("Measuring
Business Cycles and Forecasting"), 1961, p.
120.
1953-61: Division of Statistics, Bureau of
Economic Research, Economic Planning
Agency, Tokyo.
italy: G. Miconi, La méthode du National Bureau
of Economic Research a New York et son
applicationaudiagnosticsurl'économie
italienne, Rome, Istituto Nazionale per lo
Studio della Congiuntura, October 1961, p. 39
(data supplied by author).
CHART 2
(1) Compiled by NBER. 1947-53: Based on
change over four-quarter span in original data,
35-41 countries excluding U.S., centered.
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1954-61: Based on change over one-quarter
span in seasonally adjusted data, centered,
20 countries excludingU.S. The coun-
tries are Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium-Luxembourg,Brazil,Canada, Den-
mark, France, India, Italy, Japan, Malaya,
Mexico,Netherlands,Norway,Sweden,
Switzerland, Union of South Africa, United
Kingdom, and West Germany.
(2) Excluding U.S. imports. United Nations.
Seasonal adjustment by NBER.
(3) Excluding military shipments. Department
of Commerce.
CHART 3
See notes to Table 1, below.
CHART 4
(1) Manufacturing output divided by estimated
man-hours forall employees; compiled by
NBER from Federal Reserve Board and Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics data. For noñproduc-
tion workers a 40-hour workweek was assumed.
(2) Wages, salaries, and supplements divided by
total man-hours for all employees; compiled by
NBER from Office of Business Economics and
Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
(3) Wages, salaries, and supplements divided by
output(seeabove).Equivalentto hourly
compensation divided by output per man-hour.
CHART 5
Compiled by NBER from Office of Business
Economics, Federal Reserve Board, and Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics data. The percentage
changes during each recovery are computed
on the base of the standing of the series at the
preceding business cycle peak (three-month
average centered on the peak. month, or, in
quarterlyseries,thefigureforthe peak
quarter). For convenience, on each chart the
equivalent scales for the current recovery are
given on the right-hand side and at the bottom,
together with the peak and trough figures. Eachrecovery pattern begins at the business cycle
trough and with the level of the series at that
date, regardless of when the series itself reached
its low. The charts are carried forward a uni-
form 24 months from the trough, although in
two cases the business expansion ended a few
months earlier (Nos. 1, 8), in two a month or
so later (6, 7), while in the rest it continued
for another year or more. The median pattern
(dashed line) is the average of the middle two
or three figures at each six-month interval for
the six recoveries after 1920 and prior to 1961
that followed mild or moderate recessions (Nos.
1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7) or as many of these as the
series covers. For further analysis and ex-
amples of recoverypatterns,see Business
Cycle indicators, Vol. I, pp. 86-100, 687-735;
and Signals of Recession and Recovery, pp.
72-87.
TABLE 1
(1) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
(2) 19 19-27, 1947-61: Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. For 1919-27 the index used covers all
finished products, which includes some non-
manufactured goods and excludes some manu-
factured goods. 1927-39: Compiled by NBER
from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
(3) and (4) Compiled by NBER from Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Office of Business Eco-
nomics, and Federal Reserve Board data.
1919-38: Covers wages of production workers
only. 1947-61: Includes wages and salaries of
all employees. See series 23.1 and 23.0, Busi-
ness Cycle Indicators, Vol. II, pp. 148-149.
The quarterly series in Charts 3 and 4 includes
wage supplements; the monthly series used in
Table 1 does not.
(5) Same as (2) and (3).
(6) 1920-38: Harold Barger, Outlay and income
in the United States, 1921-1 938, New York,
NBER, 1942. 1947-61: Federal Trade Com-
mission and Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. The series used in Chart 3 is before
taxes.
(7) 1919-May 1929: Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company. June 1929-61: Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
(8) 1919-38: Cumulated netdiffusion index
compiled by NBER, based on specific cycles
in 14 series on new orders for producer durable
materials and equipment and 56 series on con-
struction contracts and building permits, in-
cluding some on residential building (based on
series D6.2, Business Cycle Indicators, Vol. II,
p. 158). 1949-61: Aggregate of new orders
for producers' durable equipment and con-
tracts for commercial and industrial building
and privately owned public works and utilities,
compiled by Bureau of the Census from data
supplied by Office of Business Economics and
F. W. Dodge Corporation. See series6.2,
Business Cycle Indicators, Vol. II, p. 90.
(9) 1919-38: Manufacturing industries only, Of-
fleeof Business Economics.1948-61:All
industries, Office of Business Economics and
Securitiesand Exchange Commission. See
series 22.1 and 22.0, Business Cycle Indicators,
Vol. II, p. 147.
Current data for series 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9 are pub-
lished in Business Cycle Developments,U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
25